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Who  should  regulate  bank  holding  companies  ?  The  recent  Treasury  proposal  to 
consolidate  the  federal  banking  agencies  would  require  that  the  Federal  Reserve  give  up  the 
power  to  regulate  bank  holding  companies  (BHCs)  that  it has  had  since  the  passage  of  the  Bank 
Holding  Company  Act  of  1956.  The  Federal  Reserve  has  argued  that  it  needs  to  regulate  bank 
holding  companies  in order  to protect  against  systemic  risk;  however,  this  argument  was  not  used 
when  the  Act  was  passed,  and  in  fact,  the  Federal  Reserve  was  indifferent  to  which  agency 
should  regulate  bank  holding  companies. 
Scholars  have  generally  concluded  that  the  assigning  of  the  BHC  responsibilities  to  the 
Fed  in  1956  was  primarily  based  on  the  historical  precedent  of  the  Clayton  Act  and  the  Banking 
Act  of  1933  which  granted  some  powers  to  the  Federal  Reserve  with  respect  to  bank  holding 
companies.  This  explanation  is  not  sufficient  because  bank  holding  company  bills  had  been 
introduced  since  1930  and  it  is  only  after  1943  that  the  Federal  Reserve  is  designated  as  the 
regulatory  agency  for  BHCs.  Why  was  there  a change? 
There  are  three  factors  which  together  explain  why  the  Federal  Reserve  was  selected  as 
the  regulatory  agency.  The  first,  and  probably  most  important,  was  in  the  legislative  response  to 
the  public  outcry  over  the  abuses  of  bank  affiliates.  The  bank  affiliates  and  holding  company 
issues  were  intertwined,  and  the  outcome  of the  Banking  Act  of  1933 had  important  implications 
for  the  future  regulation  of  BHCs.  If  the  separation  of  commercial  and  investment  banking  had 
not  occurred,  the  OCC  would  quite  likely  have  been  the  regulatory  agency  for  BHCs.  It  was 
recognized  that  a  system  of  universal  banking  (national  banks  with  affiliates)  required  a single 
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control  BHCs  specified  the  Federal  Reserve  as the  regulatory  agency,  despite  the  fact  that  at the 
time  there  was  little  rationale  for  this.  However,  the  bill  introduced  in  1943  became  the  BHCA 
of  1956.  Third,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  in  1956,  Ray  Gidney,  believed  that  BHCs 
promoted  efficiency  in  banking  and  needed  little  regulation.  Those  members  of  Congress  who 
believed  that  BHCs  should  be  tightly  controlled,  or  abolished,  had  little  incentive  to  entrust  the 
regulation  and  supervision  of  BHCs  to  Gidney.  If  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  at  the  time 
had  been  a  strong  opponent  of  the  expansion  of  BHCs,  then  there  might  have  been  reason  to 
change  the  legislation. 
A  reexamination  of  the  reasons  for  granting  regulatory  power  over  BHCs  to  the  Federal 
Reserve  is  of  direct  policy  relevance  today:  Should  we  retain  our  multiagency  regulatory 
structure  if the  U.S.  moves  toward  some  form  of  universal  banking?  The  history  of  bank  holding 
company  regulation  provides  guidance  in  answering  these  questions. 
II.  Bank  Regulation  from  1863-1927 
Before  discussing  the  regulation  of  bank  holding  companies  it  is necessary  to  provide  a 
brief  background  on  the  history  of,  and  rationale  for,  banking  regulation  in  the  U.S.  Though  the 
First  and  Second  Banks  of  the  U.S.  each  had  national  charters  and  issued  a national  currency, 
after  the  expiration  of  the  charter  of  the  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States  in  1836,  the  U.S. 
entered  a period  known  as  the  “Free  banking.”  Banks  were  chartered  by  the  states  and  subject 
to  regulation  by  the  state  banking  authorities  and  there  was  little  uniformity  in  bank  regulation. 
Because  of  the  plethora  of  monies  available,  there  were  substantial  costs  associated  with 
determining  whether  a banknote  would  be  redeemed,  and  therefore  banknotes  only  circulated  at 
par-value  within  a small  geographic  region.  Though  the  development  of  a clearinghouse  system 
helped  to  reduce  the  costs  associated  with  clearing  notes,  and  extended  the  par  exchange  area  for 
banks,  no  banknotes  circulated  at par-value  throughout  the  entire  country  during  the  Free  Banking 
era.  One  way  to deal  with  the  high  social  and  private  costs  of  non-par  clearance  would  be  to have 
a  government  issued  money,  and  by  the  1860s  such  proposals  abounded.  Instead  of  a  single 
national  bank,  as had  been  previously  been  established,  the  National  Banking  Acts  of  1863  and 
1864  established  a  national  banking  system,  a  national  currency,  and  a  federal  chartering  and Regulation  of Bank  Holding  Companies  3 
regulatory  authority,  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency. 
Banks  could  now  be chartered  either  by  individual  states,  and  subject  to  their  regulations, 
or  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  and  therefore  subject  to  national  bank  regulations.  The 
national  banks  could  issue  banknotes,  but  were  required  to  hold  $111.11  in  government  bonds 
for  each  $100  of  banknotes  issued.  The  national  banknotes,  though  not  legal  tender,  were 
convertible  into  Greenbacks  or  gold.  National  banks  also  held  short  term  commercial  loans. 
The  national  currency  was  created  at  a  time  when  Congress  had  suspended  the 
convertibility  of  Greenbacks  (issued  by  the  Treasury)  into  gold;  thus,  it  was  not  a  foregone 
conclusion  that  national  banknotes  would  circulate  at par-value.  The  banknotes  would  be  issued 
by  individual  banks,  and  the  OCC  guaranteed  that  the  Treasury  would  redeem  them  at par-value. 
For  the  government  to  guarantee  par-value  implies  the  same  requirements  that  would  be  put  on 
any  private  bank  which  would  guarantee  the  par  clearance  of  banknotes.  The  Treasury  would 
have  to  the  difference  between  the  market  value  and  par  for  any  national  banknotes.  In  order  to 
do  this,  the  Treasury  needed  information  on  the  national  banks.  This  was  accomplished  by 
imposing  limits  on  the  asset  holdings  of national  banks  (national  banks  could  not  make  real  estate 
loans,  for  example)  and  specifying  that  national  banks  would  be  subject  to  regular  examinations 
by  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  (OCC).  This  was  to  both  assure  the  public  and 
to  protect  the  Treasury.  Because  of  the  requirement  on  the  holding  of  government  securities,  it 
was  unlikely  that  the  Treasury  would  ever  incur  a loss  in the  event  of  a national  bank  failure.  The 
fundamental  rationale for  bank  regulation  was to provide  for  a  national  currency  that would 
circulate  at par-value,  and  would be  issued by banks with a very low probability  offailure,  and 
whose liabilities were effectively guaranteed  by the federal  government. 
Though  the  government  now  guaranteed  that  national  banknotes  would  clear  at par,  it did 
not  guarantee  that  bank  checking  accounts  would  clear  at  par.  We  thus  had  a  situation  with 
respect  to  bank  checking  accounts  that  had  previously  existed  with  banknotes.’  The  quantity  of 
‘As  Cyril  James  observed,  “the  National  banking  Act  failed  to  attain  its  purpose  for  reasons 
similar  to  those  that  had  prevented  the  attainment  of  the  aims  of  the  Currency  School  under  the 
Bank  Charter  Act  of  1844”  (James  1940,  198).  The  Bank  Charter  Act  divided  the  Bank  of 
England  into  lending  and  issuing  departments.  However,  the  creation  of  alternatives  to  Bank  of 
England  notes  undermined  the  attempts  to  regulate  the  money  supply  through  the  establishment 
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national  banknotes  was  also  restricted  by  the  requirement  that  only  $90  in  national  banknotes 
could  be issued  for  every  $100  of  assets  (government  debt)  held.  Though  this  restriction  was  later 
relaxed,  the  scarcity  of  government  debt  resulted  in  the  inability  of  the  national  banking  system 
to  provide  an  adequate  currency.  As  early  as  1888,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  had 
recommended  that  national  banknotes  be  issued  against  commercial  paper,  and  this  proposal  was 
warmly  endorsed  by  the  Bankers  Magazine  a few  years  later  (James  1940,  199).  The  limitations 
on  the  supply  of  national  banknotes  and  the  increase  in  checking  accounts  undermined  the 
national  banking  system.  Things  continued  with  national  currency  and  checking  accounts  co- 
existing,  but  the  panic  of  1907  led  to  a re-examination  of  the  banking  system,  and  legislation  to 
create  a national  clearinghouse. 
The  focus  of  the  legislation  passed  in  the  wake  of  the  Panic  of  1907  was  the  “elasticity” 
of  currency.  By  this  it  was  meant  that  there  should  be  a  mechanism  established  whereby  the 
money  supply  expanded  and  contracted  with  the  needs  of  commerce.  The  function  of  Federal 
Reserve  notes  was  to  provide  a ready  convertibility  of  demand  deposits  into  currency,  i.e.,  to 
function  as  a  “lender  of  last  resort.”  The  Federal  Reserve  would  act  passively  with  respect  to 
monetary  policy  by  its willingness  to  convert  other  banknotes  into  its own  liabilities.  This  would 
presumably  provide  an  alternative,  in  times  of  crisis,  to  the  conversion  of  outstanding  bank 
money  into  specie.  The  primary  tool  of the  Federal  Reserve  was  the  discount  mechanism  whereby 
each  Federal  Reserve  Bank  re-discounted  loaned  reserves  to  the  private  banks  in  its  region.  The 
aim  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  19 13 was  to  reduce  correspondent  banking  and  “pool  reserves 
in  regional  reserve  banks  where  they  could  be  used  to  make  rediscounts  to  member  banks” 
[White  1983:  641. 
At  the  time,  the  OCC  was  the  only  govemment  agency  concerned  with  banking  regulation 
and  supervision.  The  Federal  Reserve  had  some  regulatory  power  over  member  banks  by  virtue 
of  the  needs  of  its  discount  window,  however,  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  have  many  bank 
examination  personnel  and  typically  relied  upon  the  OCC  bank  examiner  reports,  or  those  of  the 
state  banking  departments. 
A  Congressional  report  summarized  bank  examination  responsibilities  of  the  various 
agencies  and  said  of  the  Federal  Reserve  examinations: Regulation  o$Bank  Holding  Companies  5 
Such  examination  is  less  formal,  and  usually  much  less  complete,  than  in  the  case  of  the 
examinations  prescribed  by  statue  for  the  legally-constituted  authorities  already  referred 
to  [those  prescribed  to  Federal  or  State  statute].  This  is a natural  consequence  of  the  fact 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  examination  is designed  in  the  main  to  determine  the  soundness 
of  rediscounts  or  advances  secured  by  United  States  Government  bonds  made  by  the 
reserve  bank  to  its  members,  as  well  as  the  soundness  of  the  member  institutions  in 
relation  to  the  activities  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  as collecting  agent  for  out-of-town 
checks  (Senate  Hearings  193 1,  1069).2 
Two  issues  which  reappeared  after  the  creation  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  were 
branching  and  permissable  activities  of  national  banks.  Though  the  National  Banking  Acts  had 
originally  been  interpreted  as  prohibiting  branches,  this  was  gradually  relaxed.  The  Federal 
Reserve  Board  in its  annual  reports  from  1915 to  1919  and  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  from 
1917  to  1921  had  recommended  liberalization  of  branching  restrictions.  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency,  Henry  M.  Dawes,  who  was  concerned  about  the  competitive  status  of  the  national 
banks,  urged  in  his  1924,  1925, 
branching  and  to  enable  national 
(Peach  1941,  40). 
and  1926  reports,  that  legislation  be  enacted  to  liberalizae 
banks  to  buy  and  sell  investment  securities,  but  not  stocks 
With  the  passage  of  the  McFadden  Act  in  1927,  national  banks  were  permitted  to  branch 
to  the  extent  that  the  respective  state  banks  were  permitted  to  do  so and  were  allowed  to  buy  and 
sell  investment  securities.  Because  national  banks  had  always  been  permitted  to  invest  in 
securities,  the  McFadden  Act  allowed  the  banks  to  underwrite  security  issues,  i.e.,  to  buy  at one 
price,  and  sell  at  another  to  customers  (Peach  1941,  41).  The  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  was 
given  the  duty  of  defining  the  types  of  investment  securities  which  were  to be included  under  this 
2The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago  described  its  examination  practices  as  follows: 
“Supervision  of  national  banks  rests  with  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  and  of  State  banks 
with  the  State  banking  departments.  Copies  of  the  reports  of  examination  of  all  national  banks 
are  filed  with  us  by  the  comptroller’s  representative,  and  copies  of  reports  of  examinations  of  all 
member  State  banks  by  the  respective  State  banking  departments,  .  .  .  Our  field  work  in  actual 
examinations  is confined  to  a limited  number  of  State  banks,  principally  the  smaller  institutions” 
(Senate  Hearings  193 1,  1069). definition  (Peach  194 1,  42). 
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Bank  affiliates  were  organized  under  state  incorporation  laws  expressly  to  engage  in 
activities  prohibited  to national  banks  (Peach  1941,  62-3).  There  were  various  ways  of  organizing 
the  relationship  between  banks  and  their  affiliates,  but  one  way  that  was  not  open  was  to  have 
the  bank  own  the  stock  of  the  affiliate.  However,  a  holding  company  structure,  whereby  the 
holding  company  owned  the  stock  of  a group  or  chain  of  banks,  was  a means  open  to  national 
banks.  Under  this  arrangement,  a security  company  owned  by  the  BHC  could  supply  the  banks 
with  securities  for  the  bank’s  own  investment,  or  the  banks  could  distribute  the  securities  to their 
customers.  The  BHC  subsidiary  banks  could  engage  in both  commercial  banking,  as well  as the 
distributing  of  securities  (Peach  194 1,  100-I).  The  growth  of  the  bank  holding  company 
structure,  though  providing  many  opportunities  to investment  bankers  who  were  experts  in setting 
up  and  financing  holding  companies,  alarmed  many  private  bankers  who  were  concerned  about 
the  implications  for  their  own  survival  (Peach  1941,  103). 
III.  The Regulation  of Bank Affiliates  and Bank Holding  Companies 
There  has  long  been  popular  and  Congressional  support  for  limitations  on  the  expansion 
of  bank  operations  outside  a defined  geographic  area.  At  the  same  time,  the  expansion  of  banks 
across  city,  county,  and  state  borders  continued  under  many  forms:  group  or  chain  banking  and 
branching.  Despite  the predominance  of unit  banking  throughout  U.S.  financial  history,  there  have 
always  been  banks  which  operated  branches,  especially  in the  southern  states.  During  the  debates 
over  the  National  Banking  Act,  the  issue  of  branch  banking  was  not  even  raised  (Fischer  196 1, 
3).  Though  the  development  of  a  bank  holding  company  form  for  banks  was  proposed  by  a 
private  banker  in  1892,  it  is  not  until  the  192Os, that  the  impact  of  the  growth  of  BHCs  on  the 
dual  banking  system  became  an  issue.  The  ability  of  state  governments  to  control  BHCs  was 
necessarily  limited  by  state  boundaries.  The  Clayton  Act  of  19 14,  as  originally  enacted, 
prohibited  the  acquisition  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  stock  of  one  corporation  by  another 
where  the  effect  of  such  acquisition  might  lessen  competition  or  tend  to  create  a monopoly.  The 
Federal  Reserve  Board  was  explicitly  given  the  power  to  enforce  these  provisions  in  the  field  of 
banking  (James  1961,  13).  There  were  deficiencies  in  the  Clayton  Act,  as  asset  acquisition Regulation  of  Bank  Holding  Companies 
became  more  important  than  stock  acquisition.-’ 
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The  growth  of  BHCs  was  also  stimulated  by  anticipation  of  changes  in  state  branching 
laws  and  continued  after  the  passage  of  the  McFadden  Act.  This  growth  can  be  attributed  to  the 
need  for  rural  bank  reform,  the  consolidation  movement  in industry,  the  fear  of  competing  groups 
and  the  possible  loss  of  correspondent  business,  restrictions  on  branch  banks  and  hope  for 
change,  and  the  bull  market  speculation  which  stimulated  demand  for  holding  company  shares 
(James  196 1,  19).  Federal  banking  officials  became  concerned  and  in  1927  Governor  Crissinger 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  called  for  federal  supervision  of  BHCs,  and  in  1929,  Comptroller 
of  the  Currency  John  Pole  expressed  similar  concerns  (James  1961,  59;  Pole  1929). 
Beginning  in  1930,  legislation  was  introduced  to  specifically  regulate  BHCS  and 
Congressional  hearings  were  held.  In  the  legislation  introduced  during  1930-32  which  sought  to 
regulate  but  not  abolish  BHCs,  the  agency  designated  to regulate  BHCs  was  the  OCC.  The  Beedy 
bill  of  January  6,  1930  (H.R.  8005)  stated  that  “every  corporation  which  may  own  or  control  the 
majority  of  the  stock  of  more  than  one  national  and/or  State  member-banks  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  shall  be  subject  to  the  visitorial  powers  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency.” 
The  McFadden  bill,  introduced  the  same  day,  stated:  “The  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  .  .  . shall 
examine  each  Federal  Reserve  Bank  and  every  member  bank  affiliated  corporation  of  such 
member  bank.”  The  bill  went  so  far  as  to  abolish  all  examination  authority  of  the  Federal 
Reserve: 
In  addition  to  the  authority  to  make  examinations  conferred  upon  the  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency  by  section  1 of  this  Act  or to  other  provisions  of  law,  all authority  conferred  by 
existing  law  upon  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  or  any  Federal  Reserve  bank  to  make  or 
approve  examinations  of  any  member  bank  or  bank  applying  for  membership  in  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  or  any  other  banking  corporation  organized  under  law  of  the 
United  States  shall,  after  the  date  of  the  approval  of  this  Act,  be  exercised  by  the 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency.  After  such  date  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  and  Federal 
31n the  only  test  of  the  Clayton  Act,  some  three  decades  after  its  enactment,  the  courts 
decided  for  the  BHC  (Transamerica)  and  against  the  claim  of  restraint  of  trade  through  merger 
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Reserve  Banks  shall  have  no  authority  to  make  such  examinations  and  shall  not  employ 
any  person  for  such  purpose. 
Other  House  bills,  introduced  by  Alan  Goldsborough  (H.R.  8363)  and  Benjamin  Strong  (H.R. 
8367),  would  have  abolished  bank  holding  companies  (Fischer  196 1, 60).  The  Goldsborough  bill 
would  take  away  the  voitng  power  from  all  shares  of  stock  in national  bank  held  by  a BHC  and 
impose  a tax  of  2  cents  per  $100  upon  any  bank  check  drawn  upon  a bank  owned  by  a  BHC. 
The  Strong  bill  required  forfeiture  of a national  bank’s  charter  upon  membership  in a bank  group, 
as  well  as  denial  of  the  use  of  the  mails  or  telegraph  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce 
(Cartinhour  193 1,  190-l).  Clearly,  the  McFadden  and  Beedy  bills  represented  a  much  more 
moderate  position  regarding  BHCs. 
In  a review  of  the  proposed  legislation  written  at the  time,  Gaines  Cartinhour  argued  that 
the  Beedy  bill  represented  the  most  reasonable  approach  because  it proposed  to examine  the  BHC 
directly,  but  it  did  not  go  far  enough.  Cartinhour  thought  that  in  order  to  give  the  Federal 
authorities  sufficient  power  to  meet  present  and  future  exigencies,  that  a bill  should  be  drafted 
which  should  include  in  its  scope  every  corporation,  whatever  its nature,  which  owns  or  controls 
twenty-tive  per  cent  of  the  voting  stock  of  one  or  more  members  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
or  of  two  or  more  banks  in  two  or  more  states  (Cartinhour  193 1,  192-3).  Corporations  which 
are  not  bank  holding  companies  would  be  exempt,  but  the  burden  of  proof  would  be  with  the 
corporation,  and  not  the  OCC.  All  authority  for  the  regulation  and  supervision  of  BHCs  would 
rest  with  the  OCC: 
The  Comptroller  should  be  authorized,  on  the  basis  of  his  investigations,  to  make  any 
order  or  impose  any  regulation  which  in  his  opinion  (in  which  he  shall  consider  any 
suggestions  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  subject  to  judicial  approval)  should  be 
necessary,  proper,  or  advisable  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  public  as  a  whole  and 
prevent  exploitation  of  American  banks  for  private  gain  (Cartinhour  193 1,  193-4). 
Because  the  OCC  was  the  primary  federal  bank  regulatory  authority,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  it was  the  designated  regulatory  authority  for  BHCs.  This  was  also  a time  when  the  Federal Regulation  of Bank  Holding  Companies  9 
Reserve  system  was  under  criticism  for  policies  which  had  contributed  to  the  stock  market 
collapse.  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the  legislation  also  treated  the  BHCs  as  an  integrated 
unit,  and  not  separate  enterprises.  It  was  recognized  that  in  order  to  get  a proper  picture  of  the 
financial  condition  of  the  banks,  it was  necessary  to  have  complete  disclosure  of  information  on 
all  holding  company  affiliates,  thus  the  consolidated  balance  sheet  of  the  bank  holding  company 
would  be  the  relevant  information. 
The  House  Hearings  on  Branch,  Chain  and  Group Banking,  held  from  February  to  June 
1930,  compiled  a  wealth  of  statistical  data,  which  revealed,  as  an  example,  that  at  the  end  of 
1929,  group  banking  (holding  company  structure)  represented  only  one-fourth  of  the  banks,  but 
approximately  one-half  of  bank  loans  and  investments.  Two  percent  of  the  banks  controlled  10% 
of  the  loans  and  investments  of  all banks  in the  U.S.  (James  196 1, 30-3 1; House  Hearings  1930). 
Near  the  end  of  the  House  hearings,  in  the  Senate  Carter  Glass  introduced  the  Banking 
Act  of  1930  (S.  4723).  In  Section  7, the  Glass  bill  provided  for  the  amendment  of  Section  52 11 
of the  Revised  Statutes  so that  each  affiliate  of  a national  banking  association  would  be  examined 
by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency.  An  affiliate  was  defined  to  include  finance  companies, 
securities  companies,  investment  trusts,  or  any  other  corporation,  “of  which  control  is  held, 
directly  or  indirectly,  through  stock  ownership  or  in  any  other  manner,  by  a national  bank  or  by 
the  shareholders  thereof  who  own  or  control  a  majority  of  the  stock  of  such  bank.”  A  bank 
holding  company  which  owned  national  banks  would  be  considered  an  affiliate.  Any  affiliate 
of  a bank  which  was  a member  of  the  Federal  Reserve  would  also  be required  to  file  reports  with 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  The  Glass  bill  was  not  enacted,  though  it  became  the  starting  point 
for  subsequent  legislation  introduced  by  Glass. 
After  the  inquiry  on  group  and  chain  banking,  Congress  broadened  its  investigation  into 
bank  affiliates.  This  was  in  large  part  the  result  of  abuses  of  the  affiliate  system  which  had 
generated  a public  outcry  and  raised  the  moral  indignation  of  members  of  Congress.  Hearings 
began  in  late  1930  and  continued  into  193 1 and  1932  (Senate  Hearings  193 1,  1932).  Witnesses 
before  the  Senate  Committee  were  unanimously  in  favor  of  examination  of  affiliates,  and  that 
these  examinations  should  be  made  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency.  Further,  it  was 
recommended  that  the  affiliates  should  periodically  publish  balance  sheets  and  a  statement  of Ronnie  J.  Phillips 
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would  make  clear  the  true  condition 
Glass  also  queried  Comptroller  Pole  on  the  duplication  of  bank  regulatory  authority.  He 
asked, 
Chairman  Glass:  Mr.  Comptroller,  to  begin  at  the  beginning,  it  has  been  periodically 
suggested  that  the  office  of the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  be abolished  and  its functions 
transferred  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  and  the  reason  given  for  such  a  suggestion  is 
that  there  is  a  large  duplication  of  functions.  Do  you  concur  in  that  belief  that  there  is 
a large  duplication  of  functions? 
Mr.  Pole:  I do  not  see,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  there  is any  duplication  of  functions.  If  the 
comptroller’s  office  were  attached  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  they  would  necessarily 
have  to  designate  somebody  to  take  charge  of  the  comptroller’s  duties,  and  while  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  has  the  right,  and  does  make  examinations  of  banks  from  time  to 
time,  I think  that  the  Board  is generally  perfectly  willing  to  rely  upon  the  reports  of  the 
comptroller’s  office  and  indeed  of  the  State  superintendents  of  banks,  and  where  they  are 
not  they  have  the  right  to make  their  own  examinations.  More  over,  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  is  a  deliberative  body,  whereas  the  functions  of  the  comptroller  are  primarily 
executive. 
Chairman  Glass:  Right  upon  that  point  .  .  . (Senate  Hearings  1931,  4). 
Glass,  the  Father  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  clearly  believed  that  the  OCC  was  the 
primary  bank  examination  agency,  and  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  examination  authority  was  a 
secondary  responsibility.  If  bank  affiliates  were  to  be  permitted,  then  they  would  be  regularly 
examined  by the  OCC.  However,  though  Glass  initially  favored  regulation  of  affiliates,  he  quickly 
came  to  favor  the  complete  separation  of  banks  and  their  securities  affiliates.  Despite  the  fact 
that  testimony  at  the  hearings  had  in  general  favored  regulation  and  not  abolition  of  affiliates, 
when  Glass  introduced  his  revised  bill  on  January  21,  1932,  it  called  for  the  abolition  of 
affiliates.  This  bill  met  with  the  immmediate  opposition  of  the  White  House,  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board,  the  Treasury  Department,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  and  the  banking  community Regulation  of Bank  Holding  Compmties  II 
(Peach  1941,  154). 
The  bill  had  been  drafted  by  H.  Parker  Willis,  Professor  of  Money  and  Banking  at 
Columbia  University,  a long  time  friend  of  Glass,  and  an economic  advisor  to the  Senate  Banking 
Committee  at this  time.  Willis  stated  that  though  the  original  draft  of  the  bill  favored  regulation 
rather  than  abolition  of  bank  affiliates,  the  public  outcry  convinced  Glass  that  abolition  was 
necessary.  It  may  have  indeed  been  a public  outcry,  but  Willis’s  view  was  well  known,  and  he 
favored  complete  separation  of  banks  and  affiliates,  and  the  legislation  re-introduced  in  1932 
reflected  his  view  (Peach  1941,  154). 
Ironically,  the  cases  of  fraud  which  aroused  the  moral  indignation  of  members  of 
Congress,  would  not  be  eliminated  by  the  separation  of  commercial  and  investment  banking.  As 
Peach  noted,  legislative  attempts  to protect  the  public  were  implemented  in the  Federal  Securities 
Act  of  1933  and  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934  (Peach  1941,  140).  Other  cases  of  abuse, 
such  as pool  operations  in  the  stock  of  parent  banks  by  affiliates  could  be  prevented  by  making 
it  illegal  for  affiliates  to  deal  in  or  own  the  stock  of  parent  banks.  Those  cases  where  officers 
of  the  banks  and  affiliates  made  a personal  profit  could  also  be  remedied  by  legislation  (Peach 
1941,  141). 
What  could  not  be  remedied  by  legislation  would  be  the  prevention  of  the  shifting  of 
undesirable  bank  assets  to  security  affiliates  in order  to hide  the  mistakes  of  parent  banks.  In this 
case,  compulsory  periodic  examinations  of  security  affiliates  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency 
would  have  revealed  this  shifting  of  assets.  Also,  you  cannot  legislate  that  banks  should  make 
no  bad  loans  or  investments.  However,  because  banks  and  their  affiliates  were  so  closely 
connected,  in  order  to  maintain  their  competitive  position,  they  had  to  aid  affiliates  in  trouble, 
or  else  the  public  would  perceive  that  there  were  problems  with  the  bank  as  well  (Peach  1941, 
142).  This  then,  as Peach  observed,  is the  major  problem  with  the  affiliate  and  should  have  been 
the  deciding  factor  in  whether  to  regulate  or  abolish  the  affiliate  system  (Peach  1941,  142). 
Eugene  Meyer,  Governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  testified  that  though  he  favored 
separation  of  securities  affiliates  from  banks,  he  thought  that  the  Board  did  not  have  great 
confidence  in  the  recommendations  of  anyone  with  respect  to  affiliates  because  of  the  lack  of 
information.  He  suggested  that  reports  and  examinations  over  a three  year  period  would  throw 
new  light  on  the  subject  (Peach  1941,  155). Ronnie  J.  Phillips  12 
IV.  The  Banking  Acts of  1933 and  1935 
The  banking  crisis  of  March  1933  propelled  the  Glass  bill  toward  passage  as part  of  the 
Banking  Act  of  1933,  which  also  included  a federal  guarantee  for  checking  accounts.  The  Glass 
restrictions  on  bank  holding  companies  were  included  in  the  Banking  Act  of  1933,  but  as James 
points  out,  there  were  three  fundamental  weaknesses  in  the  Banking  Act  of  1933  provisions  on 
BHCs:  (1)  registration  was  not  mandatory  and  it was  possible  for  some  groups  to obtain  control 
with  voting  permits;  (2)  the  restrictions  upon  expansion  were  of  questionable  value,  except  in 
extreme  cases,  and  (3)  holding  companies  were  allowed  to  continue  investing  in  nonbanking 
enterprises.  The  Securities  Acts  of  1933  and  1934  required  that  BHCs  whose  securities  were 
registered  on  a  stock  exchange  or  which  wished  to  offer  sizable  new  issues  in  interstate 
commerce,  had  to  file  periodic  reports  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (Fischer 
1961,  63). 
The  Banking  Act  of  1933  proposed  to  do  for  bank  deposit  accounts  what  the  National 
Banking  Act  had  done  for  banknotes.  Deposit  insurance  was  purely  a creation  of  Congress  where 
its  adoption  in  1933  was,  according  to  Carter  Golembe,  due  to  a uniting  of  two  groups:  those 
that  wished  to  end  the  destruction  of  circulating  medium  due  to  bank  failures  and  those  who 
sought  to  preserve  the  existing  bank  structure  [Golembe  1960:  1821. 
The  Act  created  a new  independent  government  agency  to  regulate  the  banks,  the  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation.  The  FDIC’s  function  was  to  assure  an  adequate  fund  to  protect 
the  par-value  of  bank  deposits,  but  without  putting  a strain  on  the  federal  budget.  As  Mark  Flood 
(1992)  documents,  Congress  understood  the  problems  with  deposit  insurance  and  took  measures 
to  protect  the  depositors  and  the  Treasury. 
There  were  now  three  bank  regulatory  agencies:  the  OCC,  the  Federal  Reserve,  and  the 
FDIC.  The  rationale  for  the  bank  examination  authority  of  the  OCC  and  the  FDIC  were  quite 
similar.  The  OCC  was  originally  charged  with  guaranteeing  the  par-value  of  banknotes,  and  thus 
required  information  about  banks,  and  similarly,  the  FDIC  not  guaranteed  the  par-value  of  bank 
deposits.  Logically,  the  OCC  and  FDIC  could  have  been  consolidated,  and  as will  be  discussed 
below,  there  were  attempts  to do  so.  But  what  about  the  bank  examination  powers  of  the  Federal 
Reserve?  Its  original  rationale  for  bank  examination  authority,  the  use  of  the  discount  window, 
had  virtually  disappeared.  The  Banking  Act  of  1935  gave  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  new  powers Regulation  of Bank  Holding  Companies  I3 
to  take  an  active  role  in  supplying  the  proper  money  supply  through  the  use  of  operation  market 
operations  and  reserve  requirements.  The  use  of  the  discount  window  turned  out  to  be  impotent 
in preventing  the  collapse  of  the  banking  system  during  the  Great  Depression,  and  its role,  which 
diminished  in  the  1920s  and  early  1930s  was  further  reduced  by  the  Act.  The  Banking  Act  of 
1935  did  not  not  expand  the  examination  authority  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  and  there  was 
only  a minor  revision  of  the  provisions  of  the  Banking  Act  of  1933  with  respect  to  bank  holding 
companies. 
V. Bank  Holding  Company  Regulation  Bills after  1935 
There  was  dissatisfaction  with  the  holding  company  provisions  of  the  Banking  Act  of 
1933,  and  President  Roosevelt,  who  was  a strong  opponent  of  group  banking,  in  a  1938  address 
to  Congress,  called  for  the  abolition  of  holding  companies,  specifically  mentioning  the  evils  of 
bank  holding  companies  (Fisher  1961,  65).  Less  than  two  weeks  before  Roosevelt’s  address, 
Senators  Glass  and  McAdoo  introduced  a  bill  to  regulate  BHCs  (S.  3575).  The  bill  was 
introduced  in  the  House  by  Congressman  Steagall  (H.R.  9702).  Secretary  Morgenthau  went  on 
record  in  support  of  the  Glass/McAdoo  bill  (New  York Times,  1 February  1938,  11:2).  The  bills 
replaced  the  OCC  as  the  regulatory  authority  with  regulation  and  supervision  by  the  FDIC. 
However,  because  it  was  felt  that  there  was  insufficient  time  to  consider  the  bills  in  the  current 
session,  they  were  withdrawn  at  the  request  of  Treasury  Secretary  Morgenthau. 
At  the  same  time,  responsibilities  of  the  OCC  and  the  FDIC  overlapped  and  consolidation 
into  one  agency  was  an  alternative.  The  OCC  had  a long  history  and  large  staff  engaged  in bank 
examinations,  and  the  FDIC  had  the  responsibility  for  guaranteeing  bank  deposits.  In  1937,  a 
study  by  the  Brookings  Institution  prepared  for  the  Senate  banking  committee  recommended  that 
the  FDIC  be  the  sole  examination  agency  (Benston  et  al  1986,  284). 
On  April  3,  1939,  Senator  Prentiss  Brown  of  Michigan  introduced  a bill  to  transfer  to the 
FDIC  all  bank  examining  functions  (Congressional  Record  1939,  37045).  In  designating  the 
authority  to  the  FDIC,  Brown  stated  that  the  FDIC  was  “the  only  all-inclusive  banking  agency 
of  the  Federal  Government”  and  because  the  FDIC’s  “principal  function  is  to  guarantee  the 
deposits  .  .  .  This,  necessarily,  requires  examination  by  the  Corporation  and  supervision  of  all 
banks.”  It  is  for  this  reason,  Brown  concluded  that  the  FDIC  was  “deemed  to  be  the  logical Ronnie  J.  Phillips  14 
organization  in  which  to  vest  the  examining  power.” 
However,  Brown  added  that  the  staff  of  the  FDIC  would  be  comprised  largely  of  OCC 
staff  since  that  agency  “has had  the  longest  experience,  it has  the  largest  personnel,  and  probably 
is  the  best  equipped  agency  to  handle  examinations.”  The  bill  proposed  to  transfer  that  OCC 
personnel  to  the  FDIC  in  order  to  make  that  agency  “the  foundation  upon  which  will  be  built, 
it is hoped,  a unified  examining  agency  which  will  at once  eliminate  duplication  of  organization 
and  in  time  result  in  reduction  of  personnel  and  should  result  immediately  inconsiderable 
reduction  of  expenses.”  The  bank  examination  function  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  and  Banks 
would  also  be  transferred  to  the  revamped  FDIC.  In  1941,  Senator  Glass  again  introduced  a bill 
to  regulate  BHCs  (S.  310),  and  again  specified  the  FDIC  as  the  regulatory  agency.  Though 
Morgenthau  again  publicly  supported  the  bill,  no  action  was  taken  (New  York Times,  17 January 
1941,  30:6). 
Because  of  Roosevelt’s  opposition  to  BHCs,  there  was  little  chance  legislation  would  be 
passed.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  general  thrust  of  Congress’s  actions  with 
respect  to  banking  regulation  was  to  consolidate  the  bank  examination  functions,  and  therefore 
the  regulation  of  BHCs  would  be  under  this  single  agency.  If  legislation  had  passed,  then  the 
regulatory  agency  would  have  been  the  OCC  and/or  FDIC,  or most  likely,  a consolidated  agency. 
As  World  War  Two  approached,  there  was  no  rationale  for  nor  sentiment  in  Congress,  or  in  the 
Executive  branch,  to  expand  the  bank  examination  powers  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  though 
consolidation  of  the  bank  regulatory  agencies  was  on  the  agenda.  The  anomaly  that  occurs  then 
is that  beginning  in  1943,  the  Federal  Reserve  pushes  for  expanded  regulatory  power  with  respect 
to  bank  holding  companies. 
VI.  The Federal  Reserve  Board  and Bank Holding  Company  Regulation 
During  the  war  years,  the  initiative  for  control  of  BHCs  moved  from  Congress  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  where  Marriner  Eccles  was  still  Chairman.  The  Federal  Reserve  Board’s 
Annual  Report  for  1943  contained  a  strong  attack  on  BHCs.  The  document  stated  that  the 
provisions  of  the  Banking  Act  of  1933  were  inadequate  to  regulate  BHCs,  and  immediate 
legislation  to  prevent  the  expansion  of  existing  companies  and  the  creation  of  new  ones  was 
necessary  (Fischer  1961,  65).  Also  prominent  Congressman  such  as  Senator  Glass  and Regulation  of  Bank  Holding  Companies  I5 
Congressman  Steagall  exited  from  the  scene.  Brent  Spence  of  Michigan  replaced  Steagall  as the 
Chair  of  the  House  Banking  Committee  in  1943. 
The  Board  prepared  a set of  regulations  which  became  the  basis  for  legislation  introduced 
in  1945 by  Congressman  Spence  (H.R.  2776).  Spence  introduced  his  bill  again  in  1946  (S.  6225), 
1949  (S.  5744),  1952  (S.  6504),  1955  (S.  2674),  and  1956  (S.  6227).  The  latter  was  passed  by 
Congress  and  became  the  Bank  Holding  Company  Act  of  1956.  Whether  Board  Chairman 
Marriner  Eccles’s  concerns  were  with  “turf  grabbing”  or  implicitly  authorized  by  the  granting  of 
some  regulatory  power  over  the  BHCs  by  the  Banking  Act  of  1933,  this  was  the  decisive  point 
in  the  shift  of  regulatory  power  from  the  OCC  to  the  Federal  Reserve. 
In  the  late  194Os, concern  about  the  expansion  of  the  Transamerica  Corporation  generated 
legislation  to  control  its  growth.  Senator  Tobey  introduced  a  bill  in  1947,  and  hearings  were 
held,  but  the  legislation  never  came  to  a vote  (Fischer  1961,  66;  Senate  Hearings  1947).  The 
Board  invoked  the  Clayton  Act  against  Transamerica  in  1948,  claiming  restraint  of  trade,  but 
ultimately  lost  the  court  case  in  195 1 (Fischer  196 I,  67). 
Marriner  Eccles  was  not  reappointed  to the  Federal  Reserve  Board  in  1948  in part  because 
of  his  opposition  to  the  continuation  of  the  policy  of  supporting  government  security  prices  after 
the  war  (Timberlake  1993,  3 13).  This  policy  ended  with  the  Treasury-Fed  accord  of  195 I,  and 
the  Federal  Reserve  was  free  to  pursue  an  independent  monetary  policy,  and  in  the  same  year, 
William  McChesney  Martin  was  appointed  Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  With  Eccles 
out  of  the  way,  there  was  again  an  opportunity  to  reevaluate  the  issue  of  BHC  regulation. 
At  his  nomination  hearings  in  195 1, Senator  Fulbright  asked  Martin  to  state  for  the  record 
his  views  on  the  regulation  of  BHCs.  Senator  Robertson  asked  specifically  to  know  whether 
Martin  favored  extension  on  restrictions  of  BHCs.  Martin  replied:  “I just  would  have  to  study  it 
a  little  bit  because  I  haven’t  been  in  close  touch  with  that  sort  of  thing,  and  I  am  certainly  no 
encyclopedia.”  Senator  Douglas  stated  that  Martin’s  views  would  be  important  because  it  was 
widely  believed  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  wanted  to  restrict  BHCs,  while  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  Snyder  did  not  agree  with  that  view.  Douglas  told  Martin  that  it was  very  important 
for  the  committee  to  know  where  he  stood  on  the  BHC  issue,  but  Martin  stated  that  he  had  little 
knowledge  and  did  not  want  to  make  any  offhand  remarks  without  further  information.  Though 
Martin  was  previously  an  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  he  stated  that  he  had  never Ronnie  J.  Phillips  16 
discussed  the  BHC  issue  with  the  Secretary.  Senator  Schoeppfl  asked  of  Martin:  “Then  I take 
it,  Mr.  Chairman,  you  are  in  this  present  position:  You  have  no  preconceived  idea  one  way  or 
the  other  on  that  [issue  of  BHCs]  at this  moment?”  Martin  replied  “That  is correct,  sir”  (Senabe 
Hearings  195 1,  8-9).  Martin  was  confirmed  as  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  in  April  195 1. Though  there  is no  reason  to  question  Martin’s  veracity 
on  this  issue,  he  did  not  give  the  Senators  a definite  view  on  whether  he  would  be  strongly  for 
or  against  the  continued  expansion  of  BHCs. 
Ray  Gidney  was  confirmed  as  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  in  early  1953.  He  was 
questioned  about  his  commitment  to  the  dual  banking  system.  Gidney  replied:  “I think  I  can 
speak  with  vigor  on  that.  I have  been  a dual  banking  system  man  for  50  years,  since  I first  went 
in  a  State  bank.  I have  been  in  three  State  commercial  banks  and  one  national  in  my  experience 
and  I have  had  enough  opportunity  to  see  the  reasons  for  a dual  banking  system  and  why  some 
people  want  to  be  in  one  and  some  the  other”  (Senate  Hearings  1953,  )  Gidney  had  spent 
most  of  his  life  in the  Federal  Reserve  System,  first  with  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York, 
and  immediately  prior  to his  appointment  as the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  as President  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland. 
Congress  held  hearings  on  BHC  legislation  in  1953.  In his  annual  Report,  Gidney  stressed 
that  “all  supervisory  functions  over  bank  holding  companies  should  be  vested  in  a  single 
supervisory  agency  rather  than  being  divided  up  among  two  or  more  agencies”  (KC  Annual 
Report  1953,  17).  In  the  1955  hearings,  Gidney  expressed  a preference  for  having  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  be the  supervisory  agency,  while  Martin  stated  they  he  would  not  insist  on  Federal 
Reserve  Board  supervision.  Martin  was  asked  specifically  about  regulatory  authority: 
Mr.  Bet&:  Mr.  Martin,  in  your  statement  you  refer  to  approval  of  certain  matters  by  a 
Federal  Agency.  I am  not  sure  what  you  have  in mind.  For  instance,  on  page  3 you  speak 
of  a Federal  agency. 
Mr. Martin:  The  present  bill,  Mr.  Betts,  provides  that  the  approval  shall  be  given  by  the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  The  reason  I used  the  phrase  “Federal 
agency”  is  that  we  don’t  want  to  insist  that  it  has  to  be  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.” 
Mr. Beth:  I thought  you  had  something  else  in mind  when  you  said  “a Federal  agency.” Regulation  of Bank  Hording  Companies  17 
Mr.  Martin:  Nothing  other  than  I  didn’t  want  to  appear  to  be  insisting  that  it  be  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  (House  Hearings  1955,  92-3). 
Gidney  testified: 
Mr. Multer:  Mr.  Gidney,  Chairman  Martin  seemed  to  think  that  he  had  no  objection  to 
giving  you  control  over  the  situation  and  you  think  his  Board  would  do  all  right? 
Mr.  Gidney:  Well,  we  are  all  modest,  maybe.  But  we  are  more  modest  than  he  is.  We 
think  that  the  Board  is  the  better  place  for  it  to  be. 
Mr.  Kilburn:  But  you  agree  with  him  that  it ought  to  be  in  one  hand? 
Mr.  Gidney:  We  emphatically  do,  because  this  is  going  to  be  difficult  enough  anyway, 
and  if there  is going  to  be pulling  and  hauling,  and  a controversy,  and  a competition,  that 
is  not  good.  We  have  full  confidence  that  the  Board  would  handle  it  well,  and  I  expect 
the  people  affected  would  have  that  confidence. 
Mr. Multer:  If the  Board  has jurisdiction  over  the  matter  would  there  be  any  need  to  call 
upon  your  office  for  recommendations? 
Mr.  Gidney:  I  think  so.  When  we  get  into  dealing  with  these  things  we  find  that  it  is 
very  important  to  know  the  whole  story,  to  get  different  points  of  view,  and  we  would 
like,  in  our  office,  to  have  a chance  to  have  a say,  and  I know  that  if  that  is  true  for  us, 
that  would  be  even  more  true  for  the  bank  supervisors,  who  may  feel  they  are  more 
distant  from  the  Board  than  we  are  (House  Hearings  1955,  148-9). 
Strong  arguments  were not put forward for  having the Federal  Reserve  Board  be the regulatory 
agency,  rather  Martin and  Gidney agreed  that the most important point  was to have one federal 
agency.  In the  testimoney,  Gidney  seemed  more  sure  than  Martin  that  the  Federal  Reserve  would 
be  the  approriate  agency.  The  BHCA  Act  passed  and  gave  regulatory  authority  to  the  Federal 
Reserve,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  bank  examination  expertise  was  virtually  nil 
(Stiller  1993,  6). 
Questions  were  raised  about  the  motivations  of Gidney  because  in  1962,  Raymond  Gidney 
became  chairman  of  the  board  of  the  Florida  National  Bank  of  Jacksonville,  the  largest  bank  in Ronnie  J.  Phillips  18 
the Fhida  national  group  of  banks,  controlled  by  the  estate  of  Alfred  I.  du  Pont.  The  1956  Act 
exempted  estates  controlled  holding  companies.  In  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Banking 
Committee  in  1966  on  amending  the  Bank  Holding  Company  Act  of  1956,  Gidney  testified  that 
bank  holding  companies  had  in the  past  and  continued  to be  “well  operated  and  have  served  their 
territories  admirably”  (Senate  Hearings  1966,  457).  His  praise  of  bank  holding  companies  was 
unreserved:  “They  live  up  to  the  best  traditions  of  American  banking  and  are  of  inestimable 
value  to  our  national  economy”  and  that  they  Act  “needlessly  restricts  the  operations  of  these 
companies”  (Senate  Hearings  1956,  458).  Gidney  went  so  far  as  to  state  that  he  believed  that 
“our  banking  system  would  not  be  injured  or  impaired  if  most  of  the  provisions  of  the  present 
bank  holding  company  law  were  to  be  repealed”  (Senate  Hearings  1966,  459). 
It  is  not  difficult  to  explain  why  the  Federal  Reserve  was  selected  as  the  regulatory 
agency  in  1956,  but  the  implications  of  that  are  significant.  The  legislation  that  passed  in  1956 
had  been  drafted  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  in  1943  under  Marriner  Eccles,  who  was  a 
proponent  of  branch  banking,  but  believed  that  BHCs  growth  should  be  controlled.  In  1956, 
those  in  Congress  were  presented  with  a dilemma.  If  you  favored  unit  banking,  as  many  did, 
then  you  would  want  to  abolish  BHCs.  This  was  not  politically  feasible,  and  there  was  some 
recognition  that  BHCs  could  be  beneficial.  Given  that  Gidney  clearly  would  not  be  willing  to 
constrain  BHCs,  Martin  and  the  Fed  appeared  to  be  the  most  reasonable  choice,  though  Martin 
by  1955  had  generally  a  favorable  view  of  BHCs,  and  was  certainly  not  inclined  to  halt  their 
expansion. 
VII.  Conclusion 
The  reason  typically  given  for  why  the  Federal  Reserve  was  chosen  as  the  regulator  of 
BHCs  has  been  that  an  historical  precedent  was  set  in  the  Clayton  Act  and  the  Banking  Act  of 
1933,  thus  the  argument  goes,  in  1956  the  issue  was  no  longer  controversial  and  the  Fed  was 
given  the  authority.  This  explanation  is not  satisfactory  because  the  historical  precedent  argument 
is  in  doubt  since  the  record  indicates  that  the  OCC  was  always,  and  remains  today,  the  primary 
regulator  of banks  because  of  its chartering  powers.  Why  then  was  the  OCC  not  given  regulatory 
power  over  BHCs?  There  are  three  reasons:  the  abolition  of  universal  banking,  legislative Regulation  of Bank  Holding  Companies  19 
initiatives  by  the  Federal  Reserve  in  1943,  and  concerns  about  Raymond  Gidney’s  willingness 
to  control  BHCs. 
The  delegation  of  regulatory  authority  over  BHCs  to  the  Federal  Reserve  had  important 
implications  for  the  growth  of  the  Federal  Reserve.  Historically,  the  Federal  Reserve  had  relied 
upon  examination  reports  from  the  OCC.  However,  it was  several  years  after  the  passage  of  the 
BHCA  of  1956,  that  the  Federal  Reserve  began  to  expand  its  own  examination  department.  We 
have  now  reached  a point  which  is the  exact  opposite  of  the  New  Deal  trend  toward  a separation 
of  monetary  and  regulatory  authority,  to  a situation  where  now  the  Federal  Reserve  argues  that 
it  must  have  examination  authority  in  order  to  be  able  to  conduct  monetary  policy  and  handle 
problems  of  systemic  risk.  If  the  Federal  Reserve’s  primary  function  is monetary  policy  and  a 
stable  price  level,  there  is  little  need  for  it  to  examine  banks  itself.  In  addition,  if  the  both 
monetary  and  regulatory  authority  were  concentrated  solely  in  the  Fed,  there  would  be  an 
incentive  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  overconstrain  banks  which  it  believed  endangered  the 
financial  health  of  the  nation  (Benston  et  al  1986,  293). 
The  possibility  of  some  form  of  universal  banking  in  the  U.S.  raises  the  question  of  the 
appropriate  means  for  regulating  such  institutions,  and  makes  the  debates  surrounding  the 
Banking  Act  of  1933  once  again  relevant.  BHCs  can  be viewed  as a financial  innovation  adopted 
to  avoid  bank  regulations  which  placed  constraints  on  multioffice  or  multiunit  bank  activities 
(Eisenbeis  1983,  42).  BHCs  operate  as  integrated  firms,  and  should  be  regulated  as  such  by  a 
single  federal  regulatory  agency.  Though  there  are  arguments  pro  and  con  on  this  issue,  the 
simplification,  cost  savings,  and  improved  regulation,  especially  of  bank  holding  companies, 
provide  ample  rationale  for  consolidation  of  the  bank  regulatory  agencies. Ronnie  J.  Phillips 
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